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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates whether there is a non-linear relationship between income and 
the private transfers received by households in developing countries. If private 
transfers are unresponsive to household income, expansion of public social security 
and other transfer programs is unlikely to crowd out private transfers, contrary to 
concerns first raised by Barro and Becker. There is little existing evidence for 
crowding out effects in the literature, but this may be because they have been 
obscured by methods that ignore non-linearities. If donors switch from altruistic 
motivations to exchange motivations as recipient income increases, a sharp non-linear 
relationship between private transfers and income may result. In fact, threshold 
regression techniques find such non-linearity in the Philippines and after accounting 
for these there is evidence of serious crowding out, with 30 to 80 percent of private 
transfers potentially displaced for low-income households [Cox, D., Hansen, B., and 
Jimenez, E., 2004, How responsive are private transfers to income? Evidence from a 
laissez-faire economy, Journal of Public Economics]. To see if these non-linear 
effects occur more widely, semi-parametric and threshold regression methods are 
used to model private transfers in four developing countries - China, Indonesia, Papua 
New Guinea, and Vietnam. The results of our paper suggest that non-linear crowding-
out effects are not important features of transfer behaviour in these countries. The 
transfer derivatives under a variety of assumptions only range between 0 and -0.08. If 
our results are valid, expansions of public social security to cover the poorest 
households need not be stymied by offsetting private responses.  
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I. Introduction 
According to the influential hypothesis of Barro (1974) and Becker (1974), public social 
security interventions may be neutralized by the offsetting response of private transfers. This 
“crowding out” could occur if altruistic donors reduce their transfers as public interventions 
increase the incomes of recipient groups. For example, rather than benefiting the elderly, a 
public pension program might reduce the burden on working families who had previously 
contributed to their aged parents (Lampman and Smeeding, 1983). Concerns about crowding 
out are particularly relevant to the developing countries that are beginning to construct formal 
pension and social security systems. Indeed, according to the World Bank, anywhere between 
20-91 percent of private transfers might be displaced by expansions of formal safety nets in 
developing and transition economies, although this wide range comes from a limited set of 
one-off studies rather than a comprehensive evaluation (World Bank, 2001). 
A key parameter for evaluating the crowding out hypothesis is the transfer derivative, 
which shows by how much in-coming private transfers change as the resources of the 
recipient increases. Most existing evidence suggests that transfer derivatives are small, 
making crowding out unlikely. For example, Cox and Jakubson (1995) estimate that a one 
dollar increase in public welfare spending in the United States would result in no more than a 
12 cent reduction in private transfers. Altonji, Hayashi, and Kotlikoff (1997) find that parents 
increase transfers to a child by only 13 cents for every one-dollar reduction in that child's 
income. 
 Recently, Cox, Hansen and Jimenez (2004) have suggested that the failure to find 
economically significant transfer derivatives may be because economists have looked in the 
wrong places and used the wrong methods. Developed countries may be the wrong place to 
look because they have experienced a century of large public transfers so most private 
transfers have probably long since been crowded out.1 For example, Roberts (1984) suggests 
that charity, which is one form of private transfers, was crowded out by public relief 
programs in the United States in the 1930s. But in developing countries private transfers are 
still very widespread, reaching up to one-half of the population in some cases (World Bank, 
2001). Perhaps as a result, crowding out effects seem larger in developing countries. For 
example, Jensen (2003) estimates that each rand increase in public pension income for the 
elderly in South Africa leads to a 0.25-0.30 rand reduction in transfers made by children. 
                                                
1 Public pensions were introduced in New Zealand in 1898 and in the United Kingdom in 1908. In the United 
States, the 1935 Social Security Act marked the start of a significant expansion in public transfers although 
pensions for state and local government employees dated from the 1890s. 
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 But even in developing countries, significant transfer derivatives may be disguised if 
economists use inappropriate empirical methods. Donor households may have several 
different motives for the private transfers they make, so econometric models of transfers that 
assume a single, linear regime may be mis-specified. Instead, if donors switch from altruistic 
motivations to self-interested exchange motivations as recipient income increases, a sharp 
non-linear relationship between private transfers and income may result. Cox et al. (2004) use 
threshold regression techniques to find such a non-linear relationship in the Philippines, 
where transfer derivatives are estimated to be approximately -0.4 for the poorest households 
but almost zero for richer households. For large families within a subset of the sample’s 
poorest households, transfer derivatives are in the range -0.66 to -1.06. Based on these 
results, Cox et al. (2004) suggest that the crowding out problem for public redistribution 
policy first posed by Barro and Becker is likely to be important. If this finding for the 
Philippines is robust, expansions of public transfers in developing countries may not improve 
welfare for the poor. 
 The purpose of this article is to see whether the non-linearities found by Cox et al. 
(2004) in the Philippines occur more widely in developing countries. An evaluation is needed 
because there appear to be only three other studies of non-linear transfer derivatives in 
developing countries. Kaufmann and Lindauer (1986) find a transfer derivative of -0.55 
below a threshold level of income needed to satisfy basic needs, and a derivative of zero 
above that threshold. However, this evidence comes from a sample of just 500 households in 
a single city (Santa Ana) in El Salvador, so it is not clear if it would hold more generally. 
Maitra and Ray (2003) find that for South African households below the poverty line, a rand 
of public pension income reduces private transfer receipts by -0.09 rand but for those above 
the poverty line there is no crowding out. It is not clear if this evidence is supportive of Cox 
et al.’s findings from the Philippines because even below the poverty line, the transfer 
derivative is small.2 Kazianga (2006) shows that transfer derivatives do not vary greatly 
across income quartiles in Burkina Faso and that crowding out may be minimal. However, 
unlike Cox et al. (2004) the study by Kazianga imposes the knot points for the spline rather 
than allowing the data to determine them, so it is not clear how strongly the findings 
contradict those from the Philippines. 
                                                
2 Moreover, the transfer derivative with respect to other (private) income also is positive and statistically 
significantly higher for poor households than for those above the poverty line which is not consistent with the 
findings of Cox et al. (2004). 
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The approach used here is to econometrically model the determinants of private 
transfers using household surveys from several different developing countries. By using a 
consistent set of estimation methods on similar sets of data, one source of variability in 
estimated transfer derivatives is removed. The selected countries (China, Indonesia, Papua 
New Guinea, and Vietnam) all have household surveys with comprehensive information on 
private transfers, public social security and incomes from private sources. These are all 
countries in which private transfers are important, as they are throughout Asia where there 
are strong norms about family support for the elderly (Kwon, 1999; Benjamin et al. 2000) 
and about community support for the poor (Scott, 1976).   
Despite these norms, there continues to be academic debate about whether transfers in 
some of these countries reflect altruistic motivations. For example, Secondi (1997) suggests 
that altruism does not explain the patterns of private transfers in China while Lee and Xiao 
(1998) find strong support for the hypothesis that altruistic, need-based transfers are made by 
Chinese children to their parents. Similarly, it has been claimed that in urban Papua New 
Guinea voluntary transfers do not act as an effective safety net (Mounsell-Davis, 1993) 
although contrary evidence of targeting towards the poor, the ill and the unemployed is 
provided by Gibson, Boe-Gibson and Scrimgeour (1998). Thus, even though the main 
purpose of the current paper is to assess the robustness of the finding of Cox et al. (2004), 
that there are large, and non-linear, transfer derivatives it may also provide evidence that is 
relevant to debates in the selected countries about the motivations for private transfers and the 
likely implications of expansions in public social security. 
To meet these goals, the rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section 
briefly sketches a framework for understanding and estimating the determinants of private 
transfers, setting up hypotheses about the conditions under which transfers will be crowded 
out as income rises and the conditions under which they will not. This section draws heavily 
on the work of Cox et al. (2004). Section III describes the data sets—from Indonesia, 
Vietnam, China and Papua New Guinea (PNG)—that form the heart of the empirical work in 
this paper. The fourth and fifth sections specify the empirical model and discuss the basic 
results of the regression analysis. The last two sections examine the nature of the non-
linearity that are in the data and conclude.   
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II. A Framework for Observing Non-Linear Transfer Derivatives 
Donors may have several different motives for the private transfers they make, but most 
econometric studies of transfers have assumed that a single (linear) regime operates (Cox et 
al., 2004). Instead, there may be strong crowding out effects of private transfers in some parts 
of the income distribution, where altruistic motivations predominate, but not in other parts, 
where exchange motivations predominate. These localised crowding out effects may be 
disguised when estimation methods are not sensitive to non-linearities and regime shifts. A 
prediction of non-linear transfer derivatives can be derived from either a risk sharing model 
or an augmented altruistic model that allows exchange motivated transfers. 
 The augmented altruistic model can be illustrated by considering the relationship 
between a person providing transfers—the donor—and the recipient of these transfers. The 
donor obtains utility from his own consumption, from any services the recipient provides in 
exchange for transfers, s, and from the well being of the recipient, V.  The well-being of the 
recipient depends on her consumption, Cr, and the services she provides to the donor, V(Cr, 
s), where .0<∂∂ sV 3 The recipient’s budget constraint is TIC rr +=  where Ir is her pre-
transfer income and T is the transfer she receives. For altruistically motivated transfers, 
0.rT I∂ ∂ <  As the recipient’s pre-transfer income rises, a smaller transfer is needed to get 
her consumption to the level that is optimal from the donor’s point of view. 
 At some threshold level of the recipient’s pre-transfer income, K, the transfers switch 
from altruistic to exchange-related motivations. Otherwise, declining altruistic transfers 
would violate a participation constraint. Specifically, for there to be a relationship, the 
transfers the donor provides and the services he demands have to allow the recipient’s 
welfare to be no lower than it would be if the recipient were to end the relationship, V(Ir, 0). 
One way for the donor to keep the recipient in the relationship when recipient pre-transfer 
income begins to exceed the threshold, )( KIr >  is by increasing exchange-related transfers 
(that is, it is no longer altruism). But eventually this positive transfer derivative becomes 
negative again when income level rI ′  is reached, due to opposing effects of higher Ir  on the 
supply and implicit price of services to the recipient (Cox, 1987). The result of these 
switching motivations is a non-linear and non-monotonic relationship, made up of a linear 
segment followed by an inverted-U-shape (see Figure 1, following Cox et al., 2004, p. 2199). 
                                                
3 Services, in the spirit of Cox et al. (2004), are broadly defined and include in-kind transfers of labor; mutual 
insurance loans; and/or paying of respect or exhibition of other social behavior. 
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To estimate the relationship between the recipient’s income and transfers that is 
implied by the figure, Cox et al. (2004) use a linear spline-model.4 This involves defining a 
dummy variable, d1, which takes the value 1 if  Ir ≤ K and another dummy variable d2 which 
takes the value 1 if  Ir > K. For a fixed K the continuous linear spline is a linear function of 
the variables )(*)( 1 KdKIr −  and ),(*)( 2 KdKIr −  holding constant any other determinants 
of transfers (e.g., education, age and other characteristics of the household’s income-earning 
stream). Because the threshold K is not known, however, non-linear least squares is needed. 
Specifically, for a range of possible values of K the model is estimated by OLS, yielding the 
sum of squared errors as a function of K. The conditional least squares estimate of K is then 
found by searching over K and selecting the value which gave the lowest sum of squared 
errors. 
 This spline function approach also is used in this paper to search for non-linear 
transfer derivatives. In addition, non-parametric and semi-parametric techniques also are used 
because these may be more flexible than the spline function. Consider first the semi-
parametric (or partially linear) model: 
)1(.)( uXImT r ++= β  
Transfers respond to pre-transfer income according to some unknown functional form, m( ), 
that may be either linear or non-linear, with or without kinks, while the other covariates, X, 
are assumed to have linear effects on transfers. The estimation takes place in two steps. First, 
the data are sorted in ascending order of pre-transfer income, Ir. Then β is obtained by least 
squares estimation of the first-differenced equation: 
( ) ( )
( ) )2(.
)()(
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Differencing allows one to (approximately) remove the non-parametric effects of income 
from the data and analyze the parametric portion of the model as if the non-parametric part 
was never there to begin with (Yatchew, 2003). The parameters from the initial linear 
regression on the first-differenced data, diffβˆ , are then used to remove the estimated 
parametric effects from the original data. Once this is done, non-parametric techniques can be 
applied to the ordered pairs ( )irdiffii IXT ,,βˆ−  and consistency and other properties of the 
estimator remain valid because 
( ) )3(.)()(ˆˆ ,, iiriirdiffidiffii uImuImXXT +≅++−=− βββ  
                                                
4 A quadratic specification for the region Ir >K  was rejected in favour of a single linear term. 
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In other words, diffβˆ  converges sufficiently quickly to β that the approximation in the last 
part of equation (3) leaves the asymptotic arguments unaffected (Yatchew, 2003). 
 Standard nonparametric techniques can be used to estimate equation (3), which is then 
interpreted as a semiparametric estimator because of the removal of the partially linear 
portion of the model. To compare the results of the (semiparametric) analysis that controls for 
observable covariates, we also use our data with an unconditional nonparametric estimator. 
The comparison of the semiparametric and nonparametric results can test whether adjusting 
for the (linear) covariates affects the shape of the relationship between income and transfers. 
The particular nonparametric estimator used is LOWESS, which estimates the function, 
m(Ir)=E(T|Ir), by computing an estimate of the location of transfers, T, within a specific band 
of recipient pre-transfer income Ir. For each point ),( iir TI  on a scatterplot, the smoothed 
point )ˆ,( iir TI  is formed from a locally weighted regression of a first order polynomial. The 
weights come from a tricube function (Cleveland, 1979) which decreases for points further 
away from ),,( iir TI becoming zero at the boundary. This procedure is then repeated but with 
a new set of weights defined for each ),( iir TI based on the size of the residual ),ˆ,(
ii TT where 
larger residuals have smaller weights to guard against outliers distorting the smoothed plots. 
The smoothness of the plots is also affected by the bandwidth, which is the proportion of the 
sample used for calculating the smoothed values for each point. 
 
III. Data 
We use data from six sets of household surveys from four countries to search for non-
linearities in the relationship between private transfers and the pre-transfer income of 
recipient households. The surveys are from the rural and urban sectors of Indonesia and 
Vietnam, the rural sector of China and the urban sector of Papua New Guinea. Most of the 
surveys are recent:  1997 for Indonesia; 1998 for Vietnam; and 2000 for China. Only the 
Papua New Guinea survey is somewhat dated (1988), but even then it is the same vintage as 
the Philippines survey (1988) used by Cox et al. (2004). A single cross-section is used for 
each survey, even though those for Indonesia and Vietnam are part of longer term panels. The 
variables are defined to be as close as possible to the variables used by Cox et al. (2004) for 
the Philippines seeing as our main purpose is to test if the non-linear relationship that they 
find holds more widely. Descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis are in 
Appendix Table 1. Full details on the surveys and the construction of the variables are 
reported in Appendix I. 
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To meet our goals, we believe the four study countries are appropriate.  All four of the 
countries that are the source of the data are poorer than the Philippines, both currently and for 
1988, which is when the data used in the paper by Cox et al. (2004) were collected. With the 
exception of Vietnam, each of the selected countries spend less than one percent of their GDP 
on public social security and welfare. Two of the countries spend smaller proportions of GDP 
and government expenditure on public social security than is currently spent in the 
Philippines and two of them spend slightly more (Table 1). Because their public transfer 
systems are so small, these countries, like the Philippines, should be suitable candidates for 
studying crowding out. The comparison of their public welfare spending with that in rich 
countries also indicates why it may have proved so difficult to find evidence of crowding out 
in the developed countries; when about 10 to 15 percent of GDP is allocated to public 
transfers, as it is in the United States and the United Kingdom, there may be few private 
transfers left to crowd out. 
The case of Vietnam deserves comment because of the relatively high share of 
government expenditures and GDP allocated to public transfers in this low-income country. 
Part of the expenditures comes from the Social Guarantee Fund, which provides income 
transfers to ex-soldiers and others who contributed to the re-unification of Vietnam. These 
transfers are not necessarily a needs-based redistribution, although many of the recipients are 
poor. Additionally, since 1995 the Vietnam Social Insurance and Vietnam Health Insurance 
schemes have been operating and the social insurance scheme now covers about 14 percent of 
the labour force (World Bank, 2000). Nevertheless, despite these non-trivial levels, public 
transfers are still less than one-half the value of private, inter-household transfers (Cox, 
2002). Thus, even though the government is allocating a relatively high level of GDP to 
public transfers, Vietnam should still be a relevant case for studying the potential for 
crowding out effects. 
In contrast to public transfers, private transfers are pervasive in these developing 
Asian economies. The data show that between a little less than one quarter (rural 
Cambodia—22 percent) and two-thirds (urban Papua New Guinea—65 percent) of 
households in the selected samples receive private transfers (Table 2, row 1). Similar 
proportions are observed to be making transfers (row 2). Many households also both give and 
receive transfers during the same survey period, so a clearer picture may come from those 
that are either net recipients or net donors. The share of net recipients ranges from 21 percent 
in rural Vietnam to 40 percent in urban Papua New Guinea (row 3).  The net donors have a 
similar patterns, ranging from 10 percent in rural China to 48 percent in urban Indonesia (row 
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4), although the share of observed donor households is less than recipient ones (row 4 < row 
3, except for in Indonesia) possibly because of asymmetric receiving-giving patterns (that is, 
there are more recipients since a single donor often gives to more than one household). 
For households that are net recipients of private transfers, the median income share 
for the transfers is approximately 10 percent of total, post-transfer income (ranging from 8 to 
10 percent—Table 2, row 5). This estimate is somewhat lower than other studies which 
typically estimate the mean of the ratio of transfers to post transfer income (for example, Cox 
2002, Table 2). However, the mean can be affected by a few households where transfer 
receipts exceed post-transfer income. For example, using the mean for urban Vietnam, the 
ratio of transfers to post transfer income for net recipients is 19.9 percent, compared with the 
median ratio of only 10.2 percent. Nevertheless, even for the median recipient, the private 
transfer is an important source of income. 
 
IV. Specification and Linear Estimation Results 
The empirical approach of this paper is designed to replicate as close as possible the approach 
used by Cox et al. (2004) in the Philippines. The basic model that is estimated in Cox et al. 
(2004) and this paper is: 
 
Net transfers = f(Pre-transfer income, Other income variables, Education; Other 
Household and Regional Characteristics)      (4) 
 
We also followed Cox et al. (2004) in omitting the top two percent of household incomes 
from each sample, in case there was undue influence of the extremely wealthy on the results.  
In addition to pre-transfer income, we also control for three dimensions of the 
household’s income profile.  First, we include a dummy variable for households with zero 
pre-transfer income to see if there is additional targeting of transfers to the very poor (or to 
those that suffered a particularly severe shock). The level of retirement income and a dummy 
for the presence of retirement income are used to account for any differential behavior of 
retirees.  
In addition to income, we account for a number of other factors that ex-ante could 
have an effect on transfers. As educational variables in Cox et al. (2004) were all significant 
for rural households and those for higher levels of education were significant for urban 
households, we add a series of five dummy variables for the household head’s educational 
attainment level (primary graduate; some secondary; secondary graduate; some tertiary; 
tertiary graduate vs. those that did not graduate from primary school as the base). A number 
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of other household characteristics also were included in the transfer equation, such as the age, 
gender and marital status of the household head. Further dummy variables control for 
whether the household head is employed and whether husband and wife are both employed. 
In addition, household size and composition, and a varying number of regional fixed effects 
are controlled for. Details of these variables are reported in Appendix Table 1. 
 
Linear Estimation Results 
When the transfer function (equation (1)) is constrained to be linear in pre-transfer incomes, 
the estimated transfer derivatives are universally small (Table 3, row 1). For example, in 
urban Indonesia an extra 100 Rupiah of pre-transfer income would reduce transfer receipts by 
only eight Rupiah (-0.080—column 1). In urban Papua New Guinea the response is even 
more sluggish, with recipients losing just four Kina of transfers for every 100 Kina increase 
in pre-transfer income (-0.043—column 6). An even lower response is found in Vietnam (in 
both the urban and rural samples); the transfer derivatives are not statistically significantly 
different from zero (columns 3 and 4). Thus, to the extent that the linear model is appropriate, 
even in these low-income settings with large private transfers and limited public transfers, 
crowding out does not seem to be such an important economic phenomenon.  
 The results embodied in the coefficients of the other income variables in the model 
also do not seem to provide much persuasive evidence that potential for crowding out is 
important (Table 3, rows 2 to 4). In the cases of Indonesia (rural and urban), urban Vietnam 
and PNG, there is no statistically significant targeting of private transfers to households with 
zero pre-transfer income (columns 1 to 3; 6). In rural Vietnam and rural China, the coefficient 
is positive but only significant at the 10 percent level. Even in these cases, it should be noted 
that while the magnitudes of the coefficients for rural Vietnam and rural China are large, the 
results have to be interpreted with care since only 1.6 percent of households in rural Vietnam 
and 0.3 percent of households in rural China had zero income (Appendix Table 1); in other 
words, the coefficients are based on few observations. Importantly, from a policy perspective, 
this lack of targeting of private transfers towards the extreme poor (that is, those with no 
income) suggests that there may not be too much of the giving displaced if more accurately 
targeted public transfers were introduced.  
In some countries there appears to be some substitution between retirement income 
and private transfers (Table 3, rows 3 and 4). The most notable effect is the case of rural 
Indonesia. We estimate that there is a 32 Rupiah reduction in private transfers for every 100 
Rupiah increase in retirement income (-0.324—column 2). In rural Vietnam there is an 11.5 
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Dong reduction for every 100 Dong increase in retirement income. However, these 
coefficients are also only significant at the 10 percent level, and as in the case of the “has no 
income” variable, this affects relatively few people (e.g., only 2.4 percent of households in 
rural Indonesia receive retirement income).5 In rural China the presence, but not the amount, 
of retirement income appears to reduce private transfer receipts (for the 1.5 percent of 
households that have access to retirement income).  
 A sensitivity analysis was carried out on the estimated (linear) effect of pre-transfer 
income by re-estimating Table 3 without the other income variables (Appendix Table 2). This 
simplified specification may be appropriate because most of the other income variables in the 
model had coefficients that were not statistically significant. However, this caused only 
modest changes in two of the estimated transfer derivatives.  For example, the coefficient for 
rural Indonesia becomes to -0.073 (from -0.69 in Table 3); the coefficient for urban Papua 
New Guinea becomes -0.047 (from -0.043 in Table 3). 
 Alternatively, we also conducted another type of sensitivity analysis because of the 
possibility of measurement error attenuating the linear transfer derivatives towards zero. To 
account for this effect, we use an instrumental variables (IV) estimation approach.6 In this 
analysis the instruments used were dwelling characteristics, such as size and number of 
rooms, and in all cases the F-test from the first stage regression showed these to be highly 
correlated with pre-transfer income. Over-identification tests support the validity of this set of 
instruments. Even when accounting for the potential effect of measurement error and reverse 
causality, we find little evidence of severe crowding out. In other words, the results reported 
in Table 4 provide no support for the idea that the small value of the transfer derivatives in 
the previous OLS results is because of a biased estimator. In fact, in all cases the IV estimates 
of the transfer derivatives become less negative (Table 4, row 1 versus Table 3, row 1); the 
coefficients either become positive or insignificant (that is, statistically zero).7  
 Although not the main focus of the paper, some of the results for the characteristics 
other than income warrant comment (Table 3). With the exception of rural China, households 
in which the heads are more highly educated appear to receive more transfers, conditional on 
income. It should be noted, however, the definition of the education attainment varies across 
the surveys (somewhat more than for other variables), which may affect the interpretation of 
these findings. The only evidence of transfers being targeted to households headed by the 
                                                
5 This is similar to the rate of substitution found by Jensen (2003) for public pension income in South Africa. 
6 This approach is also used by Kazianga (2006) to deal with concerns about measurement error and reverse 
causality. 
7 It should be noted that the Hausman tests are insignificant in all cases so there is no reason to prefer these 
positive transfer derivatives in Table 4 over the statistically insignificant ones found in Table 3. 
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elderly is from rural Vietnam, despite previous evidence in the literature for this effect in 
Indonesia (Ravallion and Dearden, 1988). Households in which the head is married (or 
married and female, as in rural China) receive higher transfers in four of the samples, and this 
seems to matter more than the gender of the household head (except for rural China). There is 
some evidence that families with more young children receive lower transfers, while those 
with more adults receive more transfers. This pattern could reflect some implicit views about 
equivalence scales held by the donors (Olken, 2005). Transfers are targeted towards 
households where the head is unemployed in three of the samples (both sectors of Vietnam 
and urban Papua New Guinea). 
 
V. Are There Non-Linear Transfer Derivatives? 
The results of the nonparametric and semiparametric analysis are fairly clear (Figure 2, 
Panels A to F) and largely consistent with the results of the OLS models reported above.  In 
the case of urban and rural Indonesia, rural China and urban PNG (panels A, B, E and F), the 
non parametric analysis (the solid line in each panel of Figure 2) traces out a relationship 
between pretransfer income and net transfers receives that shows there is some crowding out 
effect.  However, in each of the cases the slope appears to be small, less than around -0.1.  In 
other words, there is some fall in transfers as a family’s pretransfer income rises, but it is not 
large. In the cases of urban and rural Vietnam, the nonparametric analysis is either upward 
sloping or flat over most of the income range (panels C and D). 
 The nonparametric analysis (top, solid line) also demonstrates that there is no 
universal relationship between transfers and pre-transfer income that looks nonlinear in a way 
that is hypothesized in Figure 1. For example, in PNG, there is initially a fall in transfers 
across the first quartile (Figure 2, panel F). Throughout the second and quartiles the response 
is minimal, or near zero; the response in for those relatively well-off in the sample’s fourth 
quartile begins to rise. In the nonparametic analysis, there are also some nonlinearities found 
in urban and rural Vietnam and to a lesser extent in rural China (Panels C to E). For both 
urban and rural Indonesia the nonparametric line is nearly linear.  
 However, once the other covariates are accounted for using the semiparametric 
estimator the pattern disappears for all countries (Figure 2, panels A to F, dashed line). 
Specifically, after holding constant the effects of education, age, family demographics and 
regional characteristics, there is basically a linear relationship between net transfer receipts 
and pre-transfer income.  In other words, there is really no evidence in the semiparametric 
analysis that would support the prediction of the mixed motivation for transfers model (that 
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is, a shift from altruism at low income levels to exchange at higher levels of income). At least 
for low levels of income, these findings are consistent as those found in Kazianga (2006).  
 
Spline Model 
The spline analysis of the threshold coefficients (that is, the estimate of the point at which 
there is a nonlinearity in the relationship between transfer receipts and pre-transfer income) 
initially suggests that there may be non-linearities in the transfer derivative as predicted by 
the mixed motivation hypothesis. When the same linear spline model that Cox et al. (2004) 
used is estimated, in fact, we do find a significant threshold effect in five out of the six 
models (Table 5, columns 1 to 4; 6). Only in the case of rural China is there not a significant 
threshold.  The threshold parameters of urban and rural Indonesia, rural Vietnam and urban 
PNG are significant at the 5% or 1% level. When there is a significant threshold, the 
implication is that the relationship between transfers and pre-transfer income changes.  
 Closer inspection, however, shows that while there may be nonlinearities, they are not 
consistent with the hypothesis of the mixed motivation model. In the case of the countries in 
which the threshold coefficient is significant (that is, all but rural China), in four out of the 
five case the threshold is at a level that is far beyond the mean (nearly double the mean in the 
cases of urban and rural Indonesia and urban PNG; and higher than the mean in the case of 
urban Vietnam—Table 5, row 1 versus Appendix Table 1, row 2). There findings imply that 
although there maybe a nonlinearity, for most of those people in the income distribution that 
we are concerned about (that is those that are not relatively rich), the relationship between 
pretransfer income and transfer receipts is linear.  
In addition, even disregarding the magnitude of the threshold, when comparing the 
slopes of the relationship between transfers and pre-transfer income below the threshold 
(Table 5, row 2) and those above the threshold (Table 5, row 3), the pattern is not consistent 
with the mixed motivation model. For example, in the case of urban and rural Indonesia, the 
slope is more negative after the threshold (not less negative as predicted by the mixed 
motivation hypothesis). In the case of urban and rural Vietnam, the point estimates of the 
coefficient on the pre-transfer income variable below the threshold is positive (and it is 
smaller below the threshold). Only in urban PNG (which is somewhat consistent with the 
semiparametric result), is there a negative slope before the threshold and more positive (or 
zero) slope after the threshold.  
Perhaps most importantly, in none of our case studies (including urban PNG) is there 
much evidence of severe crowding out. In the four cases in which the coefficients on the pre-
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transfer income variable is negative for poor households (that is, below the threshold—Table 
5, row 2, columns 1, 2, 5 and 6), the magnitude of the coefficient never exceeds -0.083 (for 
urban PNG). This means in the place where the crowding out is most severe, for every 100 
Kina by which pre-transfer income is raised, transfers only drop by 8.3 Kina. In urban and 
rural Indonesia and rural China the drop is around 5 or less. In urban and rural Vietnam there 
is no decline. In short, our results, while similar to those in the work of Kazianga (2006) in 
Burkina Faso, differ substantially from those in Cox et al. (2004). Since at low levels of 
income crowding out is minimal, this suggests that public transfers targeting poor households 
may be effective. 
 
VI. Conclusions 
The research reported in this article has followed the recommendation of Cox et al. (2004, p. 
2217) that “future work on private transfers should focus on sharp non-linear relationships, 
preferably in settings where public transfers are small.” Specifically, we examined how 
responsive private transfers are to the pre-transfer income of recipient households in six 
different samples from four developing countries. When a linear model is used, these transfer 
derivatives are uniformly small. This finding is consistent with most previous evidence with 
linear models, and implies that crowding out problems are unlikely because private transfers 
respond so sluggishly to changes in pre-transfer incomes.  
While the scope for crowding out may be disguised by a failure to detect non-
linearities that does not seem to be the case in the samples studied in this paper. Following 
the method used by Cox et al. (2004) and also using a more flexible semiparametric method 
did not reveal any sharp non-linearities. Only urban Papua New Guinea follows the pattern 
found in the Philippines, but with much smaller non-linearities. For example, the threshold in 
urban Papua New Guinea is found at the 87th percentile. Moreover, the transfer derivative for 
the poorer households is -0.083 compared with 0.04 (or 0, since the standard error of the 
coefficient is large relative to the magnitude of the coefficient) for the richest 13 percent of 
households. This is quite different than the pattern found in the Philippines where the 
threshold occurred at a lower income and the difference in transfer derivatives above and 
below the threshold was much greater. 
Based on these findings, there is not a very compelling case for the widespread 
presence of potential crowding out effects. Thus, the crowding out problem for public 
redistribution policy first posed by Barro and Becker may not so important. This is good 
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news for those policy makers that propose using public transfer schemes to try to increase the 
incomes of the poor. 
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Figure 1. Predicted Pattern of the Relationship between Transfers and Recipient Income 
Under a “Switching Motivations for Transfer” Model.
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Figure 2b: Rural Indonesia
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Figure 2d: Rural Vietnam
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Figure 2e: Rural China
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Figure 2f: Urban Papua New Guinea
 
 
Figure 2. Nonparametric and Semiparametric Estimates of the Relationship between Transfer 
Receipts and Pre-transfer Income in Four Countries
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Table 1. Importance of Public Social Security in Selected Countries, 1988. 
 
  Social Security and Welfare Payments as % 
of: 
Country Year Government Expenditure GDP 
Per Capita 
GDP ($PPP)a 
Comparison 
Countries 
   United States 
 
 
1998 
 
 
28.7 
 
 
9.8 
 
 
30,600 
   United Kingdom 
 
1998 36.4 14.5 21,140 
   Philippines 1988 0.8 0.1 3,070 
   Philippines 
 
1998 4.4 0.9 3,500 
     
Sample Countries, 
This Study 
  China 
 
 
1998 
 
 
2.7 
 
 
0.4 
 
 
3,120 
  Indonesia 1998 5.0 0.9 2,680 
  Papua New 
Guinea 
1988 0.5 0.1 1,990 
Vietnam 1998 12.1 2.3 1,720 
Source: Asian Development Bank Key Indicators and International Monetary Fund Government Finance 
Statistics Yearbook. 
a  In international prices from the World Bank World Development Indicators. 
 
 
 
Table 2. Characteristics of Private Transfers in Four Asian Developing Countries. 
 
 Urban 
Indonesia 
Rural 
 Indonesia
Urban 
Vietnam
Rural 
Vietnam 
Rural  
China 
Urban   
PNG 
Prevalencea    (percent)   
Percent receiving gross transfers 49 53 38 22 44 65 
Percent giving gross transfers 57 52 22 18 53 66 
Percent who are net recipients 32 37 36 21 30 40 
Percent who are net donors 48 43 17 15 10 39 
Intensity (income shares)b       
Net receipts for recipients 8 10 10 10 10 9 
Net outlays for net donors 6 7 2 3 3 6 
Notes:  
a As a percentage of all households in the sample. 
b Median of the ratio of net receipts (outlays) to post-transfer income for households who were net recipients (net donors). 
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Table 3. Linear Estimates of Net Transfer Functions using Ordinary Least Squares a 
 Urban 
Indonesia 
Rural 
 Indonesia 
Urban 
Vietnam 
Rural 
Vietnam 
Rural   
China 
Urban   
PNG 
Pre-transfer income -0.080 -0.069 0.003 0.003 -0.019 -0.043 
 (0.019)** (0.010)** (0.004) (0.006) (0.005)** (0.013)** 
       
Other income variables       
Has no income 0.123 0.112 15.354 7.781 929.861 438.473 
 (0.113) (0.088) (10.614) (4.221)+ (562.378)+ (405.634) 
       
Retirement income -0.049 -0.324 -0.180 -0.115 0.001 -0.755 
 (0.059) (0.178)+ (0.159) (0.061)+ (0.027) (1.053) 
       
Has retirement income -0.022 0.639 -4.595 -2.224 -585.185 -75.111 
 (0.150) (0.390) (9.113) (2.698) (261.507)* (380.045) 
       
Education       
Primary graduate -0.151 0.062 13.520 0.408 -52.740 98.657 
 (0.103) (0.031)* (9.517) (1.292) (112.192) (126.522) 
       
Some secondary 0.187 0.277 18.214 4.137 -44.621 79.790 
 (0.246) (0.237) (6.672)** (1.512)** (83.753) (118.669) 
       
Secondary graduate 0.050 0.033 29.323 6.306 35.657 147.581 
 (0.124) (0.061) (10.878)** (3.360)+ (144.612) (150.199) 
       
Some tertiary 0.041 -0.049 19.043 -6.531 302.095 18.253 
 (0.461) (0.176) (15.278) (18.924) (244.662) (177.553) 
       
University graduate -0.105 0.211 34.913 5.726 -307.790 410.827 
 (0.266) (0.193) (17.409)* (4.352) (126.887)* (204.670)* 
       
Other characteristics       
Age of household head 0.001 0.000 0.350 0.191 4.160 7.189 
 (0.003) (0.000) (0.316) (0.066)** (4.126) (4.529) 
       
Female household head 0.182 0.087 15.237 3.371 -418.710 449.709 
 (0.138) (0.054) (9.256)+ (2.128) (177.167)* (478.769) 
       
Married 0.171 0.081 18.919 8.159 -41.884 166.780 
 (0.128) (0.048)+ (10.061)+ (3.312)* (224.678) (227.331) 
       
Married & female-headed 0.014 0.227 -3.915 5.710 568.200 -530.167 
 (0.226) (0.150) (11.763) (4.296) (333.510)+ (511.818) 
       
No. of children < 1 yr -0.010 -0.159 -3.780 -2.800 81.145 -132.270 
 (0.135) (0.078)* (7.813) (1.465)+ (89.948) (114.534) 
       
No. of children 1-6 yrs 0.010 -0.042 2.635 2.982 -6.038 -44.286 
 (0.062) (0.021)* (5.706) (1.322)* (69.177) (38.470) 
       
No. of children 7-14 yrs 0.009 0.005 -3.910 1.688 -60.894 -34.749 
 (0.039) (0.016) (3.315) (0.671)* (48.949) (32.745) 
       
Number of adults 0.075 0.013 -0.347 -0.564 149.790 139.681 
 (0.025)** (0.011) (1.964) (0.486) (37.904)** (39.823)** 
       
Husband & wife both work 0.067 0.006 -17.495 -9.479 -96.049 118.117 
 (0.090) (0.035) (8.376)* (3.376)** (175.131) (94.875) 
       
Head not employed 0.080 0.059 17.519 8.970 -333.091 487.338 
 (0.109) (0.052) (7.962)* (4.123)* (202.767) (186.06)** 
       
Constant -0.276 0.026 -22.408 -12.421 -225.943 -666.417 
 (0.203) (0.071) (21.534) (4.855)* (279.382) (246.15)** 
       
Regional effects 12 11 6 7 5 5 
R2 0.041 0.068 0.038 0.038 0.080 0.085 
No. of observations 3291 3879 1656 4072 1103 1060 
Notes:  See over. 
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Table 3. continued. 
 
Notes: Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in ( ), **=significant at 1% level, *=significant at 5% level, +=significant 
at 10% level. The sample excludes the top two percent of household incomes. 
 
a Dependent variable, net transfers, is gross transfers received minus gross transfers given. This dependent variable and all 
other monetary values (including the transfer and other income variables) are denominated in millions of Rupiah for 
Indonesia, millions of Dong for Vietnam, Yuan for China and Kina for Papua New Guinea. 
 
Table 4. Linear Instrumental Variables Estimates of Net Transfer Functions 
 
 Urban 
Indonesia 
Rural 
 Indonesia 
Urban 
Vietnam 
Rural 
Vietnam 
Rural   
China 
Urban   
PNG 
       
Pre-transfer income -0.004 -0.013 0.117 0.055 -0.037 -0.043 
 (0.044) (0.035) (0.032)** (0.027)* (0.027) (0.036) 
       
Other income variables       
Has no income 0.379 0.192 60.355 11.032 831.766 439.969 
 (0.177)* (0.108)+ (17.68)** (4.287)* (601.540) (379.748) 
       
Retirement income -0.086 -0.346 -0.002 -0.102 0.001 -0.758 
 (0.063) (0.182)+ (0.240) (0.062)** (0.028) (1.073) 
       
Has retirement income 0.038 0.611 2.357 -1.578 -627.937 -74.807 
 (0.153) (0.393) (13.685) (2.781) (277.194)* (375.616) 
       
Other control variables  [included but not reported—see Table 3]  
       
 
F-test 1st stage instruments a 
 
22.33** 
 
49.15** 
 
10.05** 
 
88.94** 
 
17.85** 
 
21.54** 
Over-identification test b 0.64 2.65 5.74 0.10 0.39 8.95 
Hausman test (OLS vs IV) c 
 
3.74 
 
2.92 
 
20.17 
 
4.02 
 
0.48 
 
0.03 
 
Notes: Each equation also includes the other variables listed in Table 3.  Also see notes in Table 3 for other notes on 
definition of dependent variable and selected explanatory variables. 
a Instruments for pre-transfer income are variables measuring the size and quality of the dwelling. The F-test is for 
excluding these instruments in the first stage model. 
b Sargan test from a regression of the IV residuals on the full set of instruments, distributed as chi-squared in the number 
of over-identifying restrictions. 
c Hausman test for significant differences between the vector of efficient (OLS) and consistent (IV) estimates, distributed 
as χ2(k). 
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Table 5. Single-Knot Spline Function Estimates of Net Transfer Functions. 
 
 Urban 
Indonesia 
Rural 
 Indonesia
Urban 
Vietnam 
Rural 
Vietnam 
Rural  
China 
Urban   
PNG 
 
Income threshold (K) 11.24   5.24  848.17 65.63 25450 12376 
 (4.87)** (1.95)** (529.51)+ (31.12)* (25910) (2524)** 
       
 
Pre-transfer income below K -0.051 -0.050 0.023 0.061 -0.042 -0.083 
 (0.016)** (0.012)** (0.018) (0.036)+ (0.008)** (0.016)** 
       
Pre-transfer income above K -0.118 -0.098 -0.002 0.002 -0.004 0.040 
 (0.056)* (0.033)** (0.006) (0.006) (0.069) (0.044) 
       
Other Income Variables 
Has no income 0.215 0.137 28.284 9.363 757.622 736.144 
 (0.112)* (0.088) (10.080)** (4.170)* (680.10) (580.830) 
       
Retirement income -0.045 -0.323 -0.178 -0.117 -0.041 -0.649 
 (0.058) (0.175)+ (0.158) (0.061)+ (0.038) (1.208) 
       
Has retirement income -0.031 0.641 -5.507 -2.100 -223.383 -187.972 
 (0.149) (0.387)+ (9.048) (2.684) (276.198) (423.560) 
       
       
Other control variables  [included but not reported—see Table 3]  
       
Threshold quantile a 0.886 0.877 0.751 0.300 0.970 0.867 
R2 0.042 0.069 0.034 0.035 0.081 0.106 
Notes: Each equation also includes the other variables listed in Table 3.  For other notes see Table 3. 
a The proportion of the sample with incomes below the income threshold (K) where the spline function kinks. 
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Appendix I: Description of the Datasets 
 
Indonesia  
The Indonesian data are drawn from the second wave of the Indonesian Family Life Survey 
(IFLS-2) conducted in 1997. The IFLS is an on-going longitudinal survey of individuals, 
households, families, communities and facilities that collects extensive and detailed 
socioeconomic information on the lives of the respondents. In particular, the survey asks 
respondents to report on a variety of transfers, both in-kind and cash during the 12 months 
prior to the survey period. The first wave of the sample was collected in 1993 and is a 
representative of approximately 83 percent of the Indonesian population living in 13 
provinces on the islands of Sumatra, Java, Bali, West Nusa Tenggara, Kalimantan and 
Sulawesi. We treat IFLS-2 as a single cross-sectional survey in our analysis, to maintain 
comparability with the other countries that do not have panel elements. The survey covers 
7,620 households. After excluding households with the top 2 percent of incomes and with 
negative incomes, our sample reduces to 7170 households (3879 in the rural sector and 3291 
in the urban sector).  The major variables are defined as follows. Net transfers is the total 
value of cash and in- kind transfers received from persons outside of the household minus the 
total value of cash and in-kind transfers given. Transfers from parents, children, and siblings 
are counted only if they are not listed on the household roster. Pre-transfer income includes 
income from wages, profits from farm and non-farm businesses, rent income from household 
assets, farm and non-farm businesses assets and income from other sources, which includes 
retirement income, income from scholarships, insurance payouts, lottery winnings, interest 
from rotating credit schemes and bonus income. Adults are defined as all household members 
aged 15 or older, and children are those aged 14 or less.  The employment status of the 
household head and their spouse refers to whether they had held any job at anytime in the 
previous 12 months. The instruments used to identify I income in the instrumental variable 
regressions are the number of rooms, size of the house, roof type and floor type of the 
dwelling.  
 
Vietnam 
The Vietnamese data come from the 1997/1998 Viet Nam Living Standards Survey (VLSS), 
based on a sample of 6002 households in 194 rural and urban communes. Net remittances are 
remittances received less assistance expenses. Our pre-transfer income variable includes 
wages, profits from agricultural and non-agricultural household businesses, rent income and 
income from miscellaneous sources such as interest, dividends, lottery winnings, sales of 
jewellery, property, durables, and other household goods. Imputed income from the 
household’s own dwelling, which was constructed by the Viet Nam General Statistical 
Office, is also added. The value of home-made products consumed by the household is 
treated as an income. Retirement income is loosely defined as income from social insurance 
schemes which come from the government (which may include disability benefits but these 
cannot be separated in the raw data). Adults comprise all those household members who are 
at least 15 years of age and children are those 14 years old or younger. Children are in turn 
classified into 3 age groups: less than 1 year olds, 1-6 years old, and 7-14 year olds. Heads of 
households are sorted into 5 categories based on their schooling achievement: some primary 
education or less, completed primary education, some secondary education, completed 
secondary education, some tertiary education, and completed university education.  
Employment status of the household head and their spouse refers to whether the household 
head or spouse held any job at anytime during 12 month period prior to the survey. We use 7 
regional dummies for Northeast, Northwest, North Central Coast, South Central Coast, 
Central Highlands, Southeast and Mekong River Delta; in the analysis, the Red River Delta 
region is the excluded category. 
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China 
The data from China is a nationally representative sample of 60 villages in six provinces of 
rural China conducted by the Center for Chinese Agricultural Policy (CCAP), Chinese 
Academy of Sciences, UC Davis and the University of Toronto in 2000.8  The survey covers 
1199 households and gathers detailed information on household demographic characteristics, 
wealth, agricultural production, non-farm activities and investment. In addition, the survey 
also asks households about transfers during the 12 months prior to the survey period. After 
excluding households with the top 2 percent of incomes and those with negative incomes, our 
sample reduces to 1103 households.  We defined our major variables as follows: net transfers 
is the total value of cash and in- kind transfers received from persons outside of the 
household minus the total value of cash and in-kind transfers given. Transfers from parents, 
children, siblings, relative and spouses are counted only if they are not listed on the 
household roster. Pre-transfer income includes income from wages, income from animal 
husbandry, profits from farm and non farm businesses, and income from other sources, which 
includes interest income, rental income, and income from asset sales, pensions and subsidies. 
The instruments used to identify income in the instrumental variable regression are the 
number of rooms and size of the house. We defined adults as all household members aged 15 
or older, and children are those aged 14 or less.  For the educational variables, the completion 
of grade 6 indicated a primary school graduate, and the completion of grade 12 indicated a 
secondary school graduate. 
 
Papua New Guinea 
The urban Papua New Guinea data are taken from the Urban Household Survey, carried out 
in the nation’s largest urban areas in 1987/8. The starting sample is 1,094 households that 
have full information on transfers, income and demographics. After excluding households 
with the top 2% of incomes and those with negative incomes the sample reduces to 1,060. 
The survey asked households about income and transfers that they received or gave during 
the two weeks before the survey; these are then “grossed” up to represent annual figures. The 
major variables are defined as follows: net transfers is the total value of cash and in-kind 
transfers received from persons outside of the household minus the total value of cash and in-
kind transfers given. Transfers from absent spouses are counted only if the spouse is not 
listed on the household roster. Pre-transfer income includes income from wages, profit from 
formal businesses and net revenue from small-scale, informal activities. The instruments for 
income in the instrumental variable regression are the number of rooms and floor area of the 
dwelling and a set of dummy variables indicating the type of dwelling as ascertained by the 
interviewer (high cost, low cost, makeshift, or traditional). For the control variables, 
retirement income was retrieved from the recorded components of “other” income. For the 
educational variables, the completion of grade 6 indicated a primary school graduate and the 
completion of grade 10 a secondary school graduate. 
                                                
8 The provinces are Hebei, Liaoning, Shaanxi, Zhejiang, Hubei and Sichuan. 
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Appendix Table 1. Descriptive Statistics from Six Surveys in Four Countries. 
 Urban 
Indonesia 
Rural 
 Indonesia 
Urban 
Vietnam 
Rural 
Vietnam 
Rural   
China 
Urban   
PNG 
Net transfers  received -0.066 -0.008 24.442 3.886 292.978 10.024 
 (2.146) (0.902) (111.756) (40.171) (1109.621) (143.307) 
       
Pre-transfer income 5.125 2.377 717.7 167.1 7264.486 6390.7 
 (5.330) (2.603) (1014.253) (178.726) (7001.815) (5188.343) 
       
Has no income 0.038 0.036 0.037 0.016 0.003 0.031 
 (0.190) (0.187) (0.190) (0.125) (0.052) (0.174) 
       
Retirement income 0.228 0.058 10.374 3.608 83.358 4.094 
 (1.020) (0.455) (26.031) (13.636) (788.997) (51.446) 
       
Has retirement income 0.090 0.024 0.194 0.091 0.015 0.010 
 (0.286) (0.154) (0.395) (0.288) (0.120) (0.101) 
       
Primary graduate 0.225 0.232 0.098 0.132 0.151 0.166 
 (0.418) (0.422) (0.297) (0.338) (0.359) (0.372) 
       
Some secondary 0.030 0.018 0.400 0.417 0.385 0.158 
 (0.172) (0.132) (0.490) (0.493) (0.487) (0.365) 
       
Secondary graduate 0.320 0.131 0.178 0.072 0.076 0.157 
 (0.467) (0.337) (0.382) (0.259) (0.265) (0.364) 
       
Some tertiary 0.010 0.003 0.034 0.006 0.017 0.132 
 (0.098) (0.053) (0.182) (0.077) (0.130) (0.339) 
       
University graduate 0.035 0.008 0.068 0.005 0.058 0.058 
 (0.184) (0.089) (0.252) (0.072) (0.279) (0.235) 
       
Age of household head 46.548 47.699 49.821 47.299 45.249 37.386 
 (13.921) (20.976) (13.441) (13.867) (10.943) (10.694) 
       
Female household head 0.177 0.163 0.402 0.218 0.033 0.039 
 (0.382) (0.369) (0.490) (0.413) (0.178) (0.193) 
       
Married 0.799 0.830 0.766 0.818 0.930 0.877 
 (0.401) (0.375) (0.423) (0.386) (0.255) (0.328) 
       
Married & female-headed 0.021 0.028 0.209 0.066 0.024 0.015 
 (0.142) (0.166) (0.407) (0.248) (0.152) (0.122) 
       
No. of children < 1 yr 0.047 0.050 0.052 0.072 0.024 0.161 
 (0.212) (0.220) (0.225) (0.264) (0.158) (0.368) 
       
No. of children 1-6 yrs 0.379 0.445 0.364 0.561 0.155 1.097 
 (0.645) (0.697) (0.614) (0.790) (0.405) (1.251) 
       
No. of children 7-14 yrs 0.679 0.766 0.680 1.065 0.516 1.225 
 (0.916) (0.970) (0.867) (1.089) (0.721) (1.292) 
       
Number of adults 3.979 3.446 3.363 3.154 3.868 3.296 
 (2.093) (1.638) (1.588) (1.403) (1.720) (2.144) 
       
Husband & wife both work 0.293 0.339 0.525 0.719 0.859 0.303 
 (0.455) (0.473) (0.500) (0.449) (0.349) (0.460) 
       
Head not employed 0.178 0.112 0.213 0.084 0.031 0.117 
 (0.383) (0.315) (0.409) (0.277) (0.173) (0.322) 
       
No. of observations 3291 3879 1656 4072 1103 1060 
Note: Monetary values are denominated in millions of Rupiah for Indonesia, millions of Dong for Vietnam, Yuan for 
China and Kina for Papua New Guinea. 
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Appendix Table 2. Sensitivity Analysis of Linear Estimates of Net Transfer Functions  
 Urban 
Indonesia 
Rural 
 Indonesia 
Urban 
Vietnam 
Rural 
Vietnam 
Rural   
China 
Urban   
PNG 
       
Pre-transfer income -0.081 -0.073 0.004 0.004 -0.019 -0.047 
 (0.019)** (0.011)** (0.004) (0.006) (0.004)** (0.013)**
       
Education       
Primary graduate -0.159 0.057 11.401 0.089 -55.520 103.712 
 (0.102) (0.030)* (9.421) (1.294) (112.728) (127.142) 
       
Some secondary 0.192 0.291 14.652 3.348 -48.781 86.490 
 (0.246) (0.238) (6.425)** (1.447)* (84.594) (118.394) 
       
Secondary graduate 0.038 0.021 25.921 5.036 37.105 160.383 
 (0.125) (0.061) (10.567)** (3.323) (144.349) (154.342) 
       
Some tertiary 0.062 -0.049 14.392 -8.242 364.988 38.732 
 (0.452) (0.176) (15.097) (19.078) (235.303) (178.158) 
       
University graduate -0.122 0.206 29.044 0.456 -316.752 446.866 
 (0.267) (0.185) (17.869)* (4.077) (127.276)* (204.798)* 
       
Other characteristics       
Age of household head 0.001 0.000 0.196 0.156 3.305 7.059 
 (0.003) (0.000) (0.274) (0.063)* (4.085) (4.384) 
       
Female household head 0.169 0.087 14.807 3.151 -434.167 430.244 
 (0.135) (0.054) (9.292) (2.134) (178.705)* (475.980) 
       
Married 0.142 0.062 16.834 7.403 -77.187 153.768 
 (0.128) (0.049) (9.815)+ (3.288)* (229.497) (224.080) 
       
Married & female-headed 0.038 0.215 -4.898 5.118 399.735 -495.723 
 (0.223) (0.150) (11.722) (4.292) (306.205) (508.450) 
       
No. of children < 1 yr -0.008 -0.156 -3.724 -2.772 81.970 -127.018 
 (0.135) (0.078)* (7.846) (1.461)+ (90.402) (113.856) 
       
No. of children 1-6 yrs 0.011 -0.039 2.575 3.071 -10.152 -43.796 
 (0.062) (0.021)* (5.719) (1.328)* (68.886) (38.389) 
       
No. of children 7-14 yrs 0.012 0.008 -3.532 1.809 -64.082 -33.533 
 (0.039) (0.017) (3.305) (0.686)** (48.714) (32.701) 
       
Number of adults 0.075 0.011 -0.680 -0.673 148.173 136.514 
 (0.025)** (0.011) (1.963) (0.487) (37.611)** (39.804)**
       
Husband & wife both work 0.073 0.010 -16.986 -9.252 -86.493 125.858 
 (0.091) (0.036) (8.328)* (3.371)** (176.066) (94.385) 
       
Head not employed 0.053 0.054 18.464 9.788 -273.600 570.655 
 (0.107) (0.058) (7.784)* (3.985)* (211.091) (195.428)**
       
Constant -0.224 0.047 -13.020 -10.338 -150.552 -630.948 
 (0.201) (0.074) (20.000) (4.788)* (273.707) (241.545)**
       
Regional effects 12 11 6 7 5 5 
R2 0.040 0.057 0.030 0.032 0.078 0.081 
No. of observations 3291 3879 1656 4072 1103 1060 
Notes: See Table 3.  
 
 
